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CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS-AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL REMEDY AS 
BASIS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN DERIVATIVE AcnoN-Defendants 
were directors of Merritt, Chapman and Scott Corporation and of Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., Inc. simultaneously. Plaintiff, a stockholder in Mer-
ritt, instituted a derivative suit to compel the resignation of defendants 
from their positions with Ward on the ground that an interlocking direc-
torate existed making Merritt subject to criminal and civil prosecution 
under federal law.1 Defendants resigned before judgment. Plaintiff, ar-
guing that its suit was the cause of the resignations and that Merritt was 
thereby benefited, moved for an award of counsel fees to be assessed against 
Merritt. Held, application for counsel fee denied. Plaintiff could have 
achieved the results sought here by invoking the aid of the Federal Trade 
Commission without expense to the corporation.2 Schechtman v. Wolfson, 
(S.D. N.Y. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 453. 
Generally, where a stockholder can show that he has been successful 
in his derivative action with consequent benefit to the corporation, he will 
be entitled to be reimbursed by the corporation for reasonable counsel fees.3 
A monetary fund accruing to the corporation is clearly sufficient to meet the 
above requirement of benefit4 but there is disagreement among the courts 
as to whether a non-fund benefit suffices.5 There is authority to the effect 
l By federal law interlocking directorates having the effect of eliminating competition 
in violation of the antitrust laws are illegal. 38 Stat. 732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §19. 
2 "Whenever the Commission or Board vested with jurisdiction thereof shall have 
reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions of 
section •.• 19 of this title, it shall issue and serve upon such person and the Attorney 
General a complaint stating its charges ...• " 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §21. 
"Any person, partnership, corporation, or association may apply to the Commission 
to institute a proceeding in respect to any violation of law over which the Commission 
has jurisdiction." Rule 4, Rules of Practice for the Federal Trade Commission, 38 Stat. 
734 (1914), 15 u.s.c. (1952) §45. 
s Atwater v. Elkhorn, 184 App. Div. 253, affd. 227 N.Y. 611 (1919); Shaw v. Harding, 
306 Mass. 441, 28 N.E. (2d) 467 (1940); Murphy v. North American, (S.D. N.Y. 1940) 
33 F. Supp. 567. 
4 Rogers v. Hill, (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 34 F. Supp. 358. 
I> Shaw v. Harding, note 4 supra, expresses the view that only pecuniary benefit, 
embodied in a fund, will entitle stockholder to reimbursement. There are cases, however, 
which have allowed reimbursement where the benefit did not consist of a fund. See 
Hornstein, "The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits,'' 39 CoL. L. REv. 784 
n. 99 (1939). 
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that entry of a judgment is not essential to the right to reimbursement,6 
although the cases which hold a fund deposited in court to be the only 
acceptable benefit would seem to require implicitly that the suit culminate 
in a judgment in favor of the stockholder.7 The principal case, however, 
was obviously not decided by an application of the above test, for the ruling 
of the court would deny recovery without regard to whether or not the 
suit resulted in a benefit to the corporation.8 The patent implication of the 
holding is that if a stockholder wants to preserve his right to a possible 
reimbursement, subject to compliance with the success-benefit criterion, 
he must show that prior to his own suit, he attempted to invoke all avail-
able gratuitous services of government agencies. Assuming that the stock-
holder in this case had complied with the court's recommended procedure, 
and that the Federal Trade Commission had taken proper action, a per-
sonal derivative suit would have been averted.9 By a ruling directed at the 
stockholder's pocket-book, the court is encouraging the substitution of gov-
ernmental remedies for the stockholder's suit. Such a rule will be welcomed 
by those who consider the merits of the stockholder's suit to be outweighed 
by its evils,10 and even the advocates of the stockholder's suit may be satis-
o Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co., 52 Idaho 599, 18 P. (2d) 288 (1932). 
" ... [T]he mere fact that he [stockholder] could not prove that he would have been 
entitled to a judgment . . . ought not to deprive him of reimbursement." Principal 
case at 455. 
7 To the effect that the success-benefit test is generally accepted, see Hornstein, "The 
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits," 39 CoL. L. REV. 784 (1939); BALLANTINE, 
CoRPORATIONs, rev. ed., c. XI (1946); 152 A.L.R. 909 (1944). 
s Principal case at 455. 
9 There is a possibility that the commission would not act upon a stockholder's sub-
mission of information. This is unlikely, however, in the present situation, i.e., where 
an interlocking directorate is involved, for the commission is empowered to institute pro-
ceedings on mere "good reason to believe" that an interlocking directorate exists. See 
note 2 supra. However, where other unfair trade practices are alleged to exist the 
commission must not only have "good reason to believe," but must decide that prosecu-
tion would be "in the interest of the public" before it can institute proceedings against 
the alleged violator. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §45 (b). In the latter situation 
the commission might well decide not to act for lack of public interest, even though 
the acts complained of would be sufficient basis for a stockholder's suit. In that case 
the stockholder, under rule of the principal case, having done his best to obtain gratuitous 
aid, could then proceed with a private suit without fear of being barred from reimburse-
ment. In this latter situation the stockholder's suit is not eliminated, but would merely 
be delayed. 
10 See discussion in Berlack, "Stockholder's Suits: a Possible Substitute," 35 MICH. L. 
REv. 597 at 600 (1937), of the "present evils" of the stockholder's.. suit. Berlack suggests 
the establishment of governmental agencies or commissions which would have exclusive 
power to conduct litigation of matters which are now dealt with in stockholder's suits. 
Regardless of the steps taken by the agency, there would be no private suits allowed. 
Obviously, the Federal Trade Commission does not conform to this ideal insofar as a 
stockholder may bring a private suit regardless of whether the commission has been 
consulted on the matter, as is clear from the principal case. However, as a result of the 
holding in the principal case, the purpose of Berlack's system, namely, to prevent the 
bringing of private stockholders' suits, may be attained indirectly since the stockholder 
will very likely prefer to take his grievances to the Federal Trade Commission and rely 
on its remedial services, if it chooses to act, rather than ignore the agency, as in the 
principal case, and foot the bill of his private suit. 
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fied with this decision even though it discourages a personal and private 
assertion of rights.11 Obviously, in the light of this holding, stockholders 
and their counsel would be well advised to investigate the possibilities of 
alternate remedial processes gratuitously offered by governmental agencies 
or bureaus before proceeding with a· private action. 
Jerome Prewoznik 
11 That governmental action might be an acceptable substitute for the stockholder's 
suit has been suggested by Hornstein, a staunch advocate of the derivative suit. " ... 
[U]ntil the stockholder's suit is supplemented with an effective preventive device, such 
as the application of criminal sanctions, the suit is society's principal safeguard." Horn-
stein, "The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits," 39 CoL. L. R.Ev. 784 at 786 
(1939). The Federal Trade Commission and other agencies like it, may, at least within 
a limited sphere of corporate abuse, provide "effective preventive devices" which would 
satisfy Hornstein. 
